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The Road to Eugenics
JAMES E. BOWMAN t
All animals are equal
But some animals are more equal than others'
-George Orwell
Animal Farm
Introduction
People are not born equal, nor do they live or die equal. Religion, race,
class, nationality, and many other categories have been the source of stigmati-
zation, discrimination, and conflict through the centuries. Inhumanity based on
perceived inequality is ubiquitous. This paper is about genetic inequality and
how it has been and may be used to foster eugenics-under the mantle of
human or medical genetics. But what is eugenics?
Eugenics' espouses the reproduction of the "fit" over the "unfit" (positive
eugenics) and discourages the birth of the "unfit" (negative eugenics).3 Francis
Galton introduced the word eugenics in 19th-century Great Britain.4 He at-
tempted to document the concentration of genius and high achievement in his
family and in families of his peers, and disparaged the intellectual abilities of
the "masses."'
'James E. Bowman, M.D., is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Pathology and
Medicine at the Pritzker School of Medicine, University of Chicago. He also serves on the
Committees on Genetics and African-American Studies at the University of Chicago.
1. George Orwell, Animal Farm 90 (Secker & Warburg 8th ed 1987).
2. Pocket Oxford Dictionary, eugenics (Oxford 8th ed 1992).
3. See Mark H. Hailer, Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought 77-78
(Rutgers 1963); Kenneth M. Ludmerer, Genetics and American Society: A Historical
Appraisal 2 (Johns Hopkins 1972).
4. See generally Francis Galton, Heriditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and
Consequences (Appleton 1875).
5. Id.
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The Fit and the Unfit
The delineation of the "fit" from the "unfit" is ancient. Ancient Greeks
proposed to control mating among the guardian (upper) class to ensure that
the offspring would produce the "best and the brightest."6 In Plato's Republic,
Socrates explores the idea that "a life spent in the doctor's hands is not worth
having," that medicine should only be practiced on those who have healthy
constitutions and healthy habits; and "weak" parents should not be allowed to
have "weak" children.7 The American Eugenics Movement in the 1920s
targeted as "unfit" individuals with epilepsy, criminals, the crippled and de-
formed; persons who were mentally defective or who had low intelligence;
patients with communicable diseases such as syphilis, tuberculosis, or leprosy;
alcoholics and drug abusers; poor people; and Eastern European immigrants to
the United States. The Nazis marked Jews, Gypsies, and other so-called non-
Aryan peoples, individuals who were mentally defective, and persons with
incurable or mental illnesses-to name a few. In the heyday of eugenics,
sterilization, infanticide, euthanasia, or a variety of "final solutions" were tools
for the prevention or elimination of the "unfit."
Today, scientific advances in genetics have improved the prospects for
negative genetics through the initiation of population screening, testing of
individuals and families who are perceived at risk for genetic disorders,
presymptomatic testing for late onset genetic disease, preimplantation genetic
diagnosis, in vitro fertilization, genetic counseling, prenatal diagnosis, with the
option for selective abortion of affected fetuses, with potentially thousands of
genetic disorders, and even innocuous genetic variations. There also have been
persistent attempts to link genetics with abusers of alcohol or drugs and with
perpetrators of violent crime with sophisticated scientific techniques that were
not available during the heyday of the American Eugenics Movement.
Today, however, we are concerned not only with persons with genetic
disease who may be stigmatized as unfit but also with those who are carriers
of recessive genetic disorders, pregnant women, newborns and, in fact, every-
one. We all have at least five recessive genes,8 but this may be just the tip of
the iceberg. When the human genome9 is mapped, many more potentially
harmful genes-recessive and otherwise-will be unveiled in each of us.
Psychoses, hypertension, diabetes, early-and late-appearing cancers, degenerative
disorders, susceptibility genes for communicable diseases, genes for various
mental deficiencies, aging genes, and other variations and disorders will be
ascertained. Consequently, in this day of rapid advances in genetics, we all are
6. Plato, Republic 98-100 (Norton 1942) (I.A. Richards, trans).
7. Id at 66, 98-100.
8. In genetics, noting a trait due to a particular allele that does not manifest itself in
the presence of other alleles which generate traits dominant to it. Stedman's Medical
Dictionary 1328 (Williams & Wilkins 25th ed 1990).
9. The total gene complement of a set of chromosomes found in higher life forms. Id
at 641.
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potentially able to pass "unfit" disorders to subsequent generations. Since we
are now in the same boat, scientific advances in the understanding of the
human genome may be one of the best defenses against a coercive eugenic
society. We rarely discriminate against those who are "like ourselves."
The Privileged Unfit
Interestingly, however; "white collar" criminal activities, such as embezzle-
ment, insider trading in the stock market, and the Savings and Loan Associa-
tion's siphoning off of hundreds of millions of dollars from its members have
not been objects of study-which suggests that classism, or racism, or both are
contributory factors to the linking of genes with crime. Holtzman and
Rothstein perceptively alluded to an example of the selectivity of eugenicists. 10
They quoted Lancelot Hogben in referring to hemophilia in the royal families
of Europe, saying, "[n]o eugenicist has publicly proposed sterilization as a
remedy for defective kingship."" Apparently, not only kings and queens but
also Fortune 500 executives are exempt from eugenic scrutiny. Consequently,
eugenics is directed invariably to the poorer classes-to the defenseless.
Active Eugenics, Passive Eugenics
Although eugenics has traditionally been divided into positive and negative
eugenics, I interject two different categories: "active eugenics," which includes
positive and negative eugenics, and "passive eugenics," which is more subtle.
Passive eugenics is the denial of appropriate medical care for more than 37
million Americans. Passive eugenics is the societal neglect of vaccination
programs for millions of poor children, many of whom will die of preventable
diseases. Passive eugenics is the dumping of poor patients in public hospitals
by so-called not-for-profit medical centers, even though some patients will
suffer irreparable harm-including death. Passive eugenics is not the storming
of abortion clinics and the murder of health care workers, but rather voting
against welfare relief for children by the same anti-choice activists. Passive
eugenics is the societal hypocrisy about a health care system that is inferior to
that of all major industrialized countries, even though politicians and corporate
czars of our health care and insurance industries equivocate in proclaiming that
our health care system is the best in the world. These and other hoaxes are
governing considerations, because a society that countenances passive eugenics
provides fertile ground for both clandestine and overt active eugenics.
Laurie Abraham has pointed out that no one is made to take responsibility
for these health care inequities and quoted medical ethicist, Larry Churchill:
10. N.A. Holtzman and M.A. Rothstein, Eugenics and Genetic Discrimination, 50 Am
J Human Genetics 457 (March 1992).
11. Id.
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Access to health care is mostly contingent on having a way to pay for it,
either out of one's own resources or with some form of insurance ....
The essential point is that [this] allocation by price is a rationing
scheme-one which we have easily accepted in health care as an exten-
sion of a basic economic philosophy, and one which largely absolves any
particular person from responsibility for the results. Since no one actually
decided to exclude the poor (as it is their lack of money that excludes
them, not our actions) no one is responsible and no one is to blame. 2
The Mythology of the "End of History"
It is evident, except to conspirators in health care inequity, that advances
in health biotechnology have not been translated into improved health care for
the poor in the United States. It is well to be reminded of this while the West
celebrates the "End of History." 3 Francis Fukuyama, borrowing from Hegel,
used this phrase to claim the triumph of the West-of the Western idea-over
that of Communist ideology. He stated:
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the
passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history
as such: that is, the end point of man's ideological evolution and the
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human
government. 4
But is the final form of human government to sanction homelessness for
several million people with their families-the freedom to live under bridges
and to beg in the streets-poverty for one-third or more of African-Americans,
inadequate to no health care for millions of Americans, a maternal and infant
mortality rate among African-Americans which is the highest of the major
industrialized countries, and far higher than that of Cuba? Consequently, the
declaration of "The End of History" is yet another reminder to poor Ameri-
cans that they are part of our cryptic mythology. Those who have power often
are so imbued with their own freedom that they disremember those who are
disadvantaged.
In a reply to Fukuyama, Himmelfarb elaborated on Fukuyama's claim that
the future of liberal democracy is assured because it has succeeded in resolving
the "class issue" and that the social problems that remain, such as black
poverty are not a function of liberalism but the historical legacy of premodern
conditions-slavery and racism.'" Himmelfarb argued that, "[h]istory has a
12. Laurie Kaye Abraham, Mama Might be Better Off Dead: The Failure of Health
Care in Urban America 34 (Chicago 1993).
13. See generally Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 National Interest 3
(Summer 1989).
14. Id at 4.
15. Gertrude Himmelfarb, Responses to Fukuyama, 16 The National Interest 19, 26
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habit of bequeathing to us disastrous legacies, bombs that can explode at any
time and any place." 6 Himmelfarb further stated that black poverty and the
poverty of the underclass is not the relic of an old problem but a new prob-
lem, and that black poverty may be subversive because liberal democracy does
not understand it, let alone how to cope with it. 7 In our democratic market
system of government, inequality, paradoxically, is cardinal. There is no
Utopia.
Anxiety About Technology
Even so, I do not join in apprehension about new genetic technology. With
each scientific discovery, instant ethical experts appear on television and
inundate the news. Meanwhile, scientists quietly make new discoveries, the full
impact of which they may be oblivious to. As long as humans explore the
unknown, consequential foresight is often impossible. The wheel, and its
derivative, the automobile, and aircraft have been more destructive to human-
kind than genetic advances ever will be, but anyone who would propose that
these discoveries be discarded-or not utilized-would have no audience.
We often forget that we live in a world with potential for scientific
advances on every continent; thus, many of our prohibitions in the United
States are mere feathers in a tornado. Accordingly, even though eugenics has
thrived intermittently since the times of Ancient Greece, I will not be fashion-
able and disparage the development of genetic technology that could potential-
ly foster eugenic ends, nor will I concoct policies to limit scientific inquiry.
Such a policy could, or would, result in the demise of molecular biology,
genetics, biochemistry, anthropology-in short, science-which is nonsensical.
Marc Lappe had a different view. He was concerned, for example, that the
discovery of bipolar disorders linked to DNA markers on chromosome 11
could be used to abort fetuses with potential manic depressive illness.' He
also asserted that such a prenatal program could deprive us of great poets like
Sylvia Plath or politicians like Winston Churchill, each of whom may have
suffered from bipolar manic depression.' 9 Lappe postulated that "uncovering
genes that regulate human vulnerability to grave illnesses such as Huntington
chorea or Alzheimer disease could increase the incidence of suicide as well as
selective abortion," and wondered what limits, if any, should be imposed on
the acquisition of such knowledge." Lappe's remarks are typical of the
incertitude of reactions to discoveries throughout history. There have been
numerous abuses of genetic testing, but most discoveries sporadically fall prey
(Summer 1989).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See generally Marc Lappe, The Limits of Genetic Inquiry, 17 Hastings Center
Report 5 (Aug 1987).
19. Id at 5.
20. Id.
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to the seduction of charlatans; however, knowledge should not be sacrificed
because of this fear. On the other hand, the concerned reservations of scientists
like Lappe are a buffer to a coercive eugenic public policy.
Public Policy
But what is public policy? From early childhood we are taught that the
"people" make decisions in a democracy. A contradictory view is that public
policy is merely what those who have power decide. Even morality has been
placed in this category. Variations of this theme are ancient. In Book I of
Plato's Republic, the Sophist, Thrasymachus, maintained that laws serve only
to protect the interest of those in power.2 Scholars of the Critical Legal
Studies movement, which I analyze later, profess that the law is not neutral,
but is guided and dictated by political considerations.22 I now review some
ethical theories that are incompatible with eugenics and others that are
congenial with eugenics.
We often associate ethics with morality, good, nonmalfeasance, beneficence,
justice, rights, and other acceptable concepts. How could ethical precepts be
associated with doctrines that historically are notorious for peoples who are at
a disadvantage because of race, class, religion, or diseases that over which they
have no control, but inherited from their parents. We do not choose our
parents. We are born into race, ethnic groups, and even class, and religion-or
no religion. It is appropriate that we begin with Kant, probably the most
quoted and revered of philosophers since Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.
Kant
Immanuel Kant, in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals asserted
that one should treat humanity always as an end and never as a means.23
Consequently, Kant's philosophy is inconsistent with eugenics precepts in that
eugenics manipulates people as a means to an end. Further, Kant's categorical
imperative dictated that one should never act in a manner that the agent could
not also will that the maxim be universal law. Kant maintained that the
attainment of the supreme principle of morality cannot be obtained by study-
ing generalizations from example as derived from experience.2 Kant postulat-
ed (or, better, dictated) that examples cannot replace moral principles, nor can
they be a foundation upon which moral principles are derived. There must first
be the moral principles, and then and only then can we judge whether an
21. Plato, Republic 24 (cited in note 6).
22. See generally Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
Harv L Rev 563 (1983); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement
(Harvard 1986).
23. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 95 (Hutchinson's 1948)
(H.J. Paton, trans).
24. Id at 75-76.
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example is one of moral goodness. Accordingly, we return to the premise:
moral principles must be a priori It follows that Kant's maxim, the categor-
ical imperative, not only takes precedence over religion but all claims, be they
individual, family, clan, or political. Thus eugenics would die in a Kantian
society. Yet, there are problems. Even though, as I indicated earlier, Kant's
ethical concepts are incompatible with eugenics, Kant's ethics are not compas-
sionate.
Utilitarianism
A major proponent of utilitarianism was John Stewart Mill. Utility, or the
Greatest Happiness Principle, asserted that actions are right in proportion as
they tend to promote happiness, and wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness." "By 'happiness' is intended pleasure, and the absence
of pain; by 'unhappiness,' pain, and the privation of pleasure."27 Utilitarians
profess that laws and social arrangements should be so constructed as to place
the interests of everyone, as much as possible, in keeping with the interests of
society.' Education should be constructed as to instill in all an association
between one's own happiness and that of the whole.' There, must be im-
planted in everyone an impulse to promote the general good."0 Utility, howev-
er, requires that the rightness or wrongness of an action should be evaluated
by the complete spectrum of intrinsic values that result from the action and
not merely happiness or pleasure."'
Arguments for and against utilitarianism were provided by Smart and
Williams.3 2 The most persuasive argument in favor of utilitarianism is that the
dictates of deontological ethics may lead to misery that utilitarianism could
have prevented. Smart asserted that this increases the attractiveness of a
utilitarian ethic because it is flexible, but it also increases the difficulty of
applying such an ethic. 3 Further, Smart suggested that even though utilitar-
ianism has consequences which are incompatible with a common moral
consciousness, so much the worse for the common moral consciousness. 34
Williams, like Smart, treated utilitarianism as a system of personal morality
rather than one of social or political decision-making." Instead of talking
25. Id at 79-80.
26. Ethel M. Albert, Theodore C. Denise and Sheldon P. Peterfreund, eds, Great Tradi-
tions in Ethics 233 (Am Book 2d ed 1969).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id at 242.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See generally J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against
(Cambridge 1973).
34. Id at 62.
35. Id at 68.
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about amounts of happiness, however, Williams preferred the economic lan-
guage of increases or decreases in one's utility-people's desires or preferences
and getting what they want or prefer. Williams believes that utilitarianism
makes integrity as a value more or less unintelligible.36 Utilitarians often
suggest that we should forgo integrity in preference to such things as concern
for the general or common good. Most importantly, however, "[w]e must face
the fact that sometimes, as the world goes, peoples' interests clash. Sometimes
the common good is served only at some individuals interests."3"
Utilitarianism, according to Williams, is a system of social decision that is
indifferent to issues of justice or equity and has less to worry about than one
that is not indifferent.38 Further, utilitarians view society and have an effect
on it, but they do not belong to it. Williams believes that in the field of
personal morality it is possible to survive under utilitarianism, but the demands
of political reality are so complex that the simplemindeness of utilitarianism
disqualifies it totally.39 Williams postulated a society in which there is a
harmless minority that does not confer any benefits on that society. As often
happens, the majority group is so prejudiced that they find even the presence
or knowledge of this group abhorrent." Plans are made to remove them.
Consequently, Williams believes that a minority group would be foolish to
accept utilitarianism, for it could very well endanger their survival. (Here,
minorities could be racial, ethnic, religious, or persons affected with disabling
genetic and other disorders.) In contrast to Kant's philosophy, eugenicists
would embrace utilitarianism.
Mackie asserted that the precept "Though shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself" is a delusion because people will not put the interests of their neigh-
bors on an equal footing with their own interests, or those who are near and
dear to them.4 Mackie bemoaned that moralists and preachers have thought
it worthwhile to propound rules that have so little chance of being followed,
because to identify morality with an ethics that will not be followed is to
bring ethics to contempt.
Justice and Injustice
Aristotle asserted that the lawless man is considered to be unjust and the
law-abiding man just, and further, all lawful acts are just acts, because the acts
laid down by the legislature are lawful.43 Further, acts that are just are those
that foster and preserve happiness and its components for society.43 Interest-
36. Id at 77.
37. Id at 118.
38. Kai Nielsen, Ethics without God 122 (Prometheus 1990).
39. Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against at 137 (cited in note 33).
40. Id at 150.
41. Id at 129-134.
42. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics 107-108 (Oxford 1980) (David Ross, trans).
43. Id at 108.
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ingly, Socrates committed suicide on orders of the citizens of Athens because
he believed that he had a duty to obey the state, and not flee-as he could
have. 44 Nevertheless, all lawful acts are not just. (Admittedly, just may be in
the eyes of the beholder.) Justice is analogous to complete virtue in the
Aristotelian sense. The individual not only applies it to himself but to his
neighbors. Even so, eugenics, historically recognized in ancient Greek society,
is probably of even more ancient origins.
John Rawls
Rawls developed A Theory of Justice in an attempt to resolve some of the
major objections to utilitarianism. In so doing he examined a social contract
mechanism that was an outgrowth of previous social contracts as outlined by
Rousseau and Kant. Rawls argued that justice denies that the loss of freedom
for some is compensated by a greater good shared by others, injustice is only
permitted when it is necessary to eschew an even greater injustice. 4' A just
society is not only designed to foster the good of its members, but is regulated
by a public impression of justice.
Rawls acknowledged that in existing societies, perceptions of what is just
and what is unjust are often controversial and that even "[t]hose who hold
different conceptions of justice can, then, still agree that institutions are just
when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of
basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between
competing claims to the advantages of social life."47
The heart of Rawls' theory is that the participants must begin under a
"veil of ignorance."4" Agents, under such a veil of ignorance, certainly would
not construct a society that would discount the interests of the poor because
they might be in that position. Since utilitarianism espouses the sacrifice of
some persons in order to promote the happiness of others, or the majority,
Rawls' precepts patently oppose eugenics.
Judith Shklar: Justice, Injustice, and Misfortune
Judith Shklar indicated that the normal model of justice maintains that any
political society is governed by rules, which set out the status and entitlements
to its members.4 This is distributive justice. Shklar further argued that the
rules of society are just if they correspond to the most basic ethical beliefs of
the society.50 Shklar prefers the term primary rather than distributive justice,
44. Plato, Apology (Bolchazy-Carducci 1981) (John Burnet, trans).
45. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap 1971).
46. Id at 3-4.
47. Id at 5.
48. Id at 136.
49. Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice 17 (Yale 1990).
50. Id.
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which is more neutral, and emphasized that no legal system can be just unless
it is managed by officials who are fair, impartial, and committed to the task
of defending the legal order that gives the society its whole character."1 Most
important, however, when these norms are not followed injustice results.
Shklar distinguished injustice from misfortune."2 For example, in regions
where thousands are killed during earthquakes, such tragedies are often
considered misfortunes. On the other hand, when it is discovered that there
would have been few casualties if the buildings had been properly constructed,
the disaster is an injustice. Misfortunes are unpreventable, but injustice is
preventable. Whenever demand exceeds supply, some will be unfortunate
(suffer misfortune), but others will suffer injustice, a common problem, for
example, in organ transplantation-except for prominent wealthy public fig-
ures. Unfortunately, inequality, injustice, and the accompanying unequal
distribution of opportunities-and the basic goods necessary to life-are rife in
most economic and political systems, a fertile ground for eugenics.
Thomas Nagel: Class Stratification is Evil
Communism tried but so far has failed to create a classless society.5 3
Nagel developed the thesis that class stratification is evil: "How could it not
be an evil that some people's life prospects at birth are radically inferior to
others'?" 4 Further, "if people could become different so that they would
support a thriving system of economic equality freely, they would . . . not
have to submerge all their personal motives and concerns beneath a desire for
the common good.""5 Such a "change in most people's character is hard to
imagine, except perhaps through the effect over many generations of social
institutions that have not been invented yet."5 6 Thus, Nagel emphasized the
central problem of reconciling what is collectively desirable with what is
individually reasonable.
Joseph Fletcher and Situation Ethics
Joseph Fletcher espoused Situation Ethics as more useful in resolving moral
dilemmas. He postulated that moral judgments are made by following one or
the other of two choices: rule ethics or situation ethics. Rule ethics involves
what one ought to do a priori, examples of which are various divine command
philosophies or deontological ethics as espoused by Kant. 7 In act or situation
ethics, the individual is central. It is up to the individual to judge what is best
51. Id at 18.
52. See generally id at 55-82.
53. Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality 28 (Oxford 1991).
54. Id at 28.
55. Id at 29.
56. Id.
57. Joseph Fletcher, Humanhood: Essays in Biomedical Ethics 2-4 (Prometheus 1979).
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under the circumstances and make a decision. This is the a posteriori ap-
proach. Collect the facts; examine the circumstances; look at the individual, the
family, the economic conditions, society and any other factors that may bear
on the situation. One seeks, as in utilitarianism, the greatest good for the
greatest number. A correct decision in one situation may be nonsensical in
another."8 As Joseph Fletcher indicated, physicians are probably more com-
fortable with situation ethics, for its precepts are what the clinician subscribes
to in daily practice.s9 Most physicians do not judge what is best for their
patients according to a categorical imperative or a religious dogma.
With the advent of new technology, considerable attention is directed to
the question: "What is a person?" Fletcher believed that in order for one to
qualify as human, or a person, the following criteria should be weighed:
- Minimum intelligence; An IQ of less than 40 places the individual in
the questionable category; an IQ of less than 20 indicates that the
individual is not a person. To quote an aphorism from Fletcher:
"Homo is indeed sapiens to be Homo."6'
- Self-awareness; self-control; a sense of time; a sense of futurity; a sense
of the past; the capability to relate to others; concern for others;
communication; control of existence; curiosity; change and
changeability; balance of rationality and feeling; idiosyncrasy-the
human being is idiomorphous, a distinctive individual; neocortical
function. 1
Eugenicists would be quite comfortable with situation ethics.
Critical Theory
Critical theory, critical legal theory, and critical social science are constant-
ly evolving with special attention to how established sources of power shape
peoples' lives and promote their collusion in their own oppression by obeying
power in automatic and uncritical ways. In David Kairys' view, law and the
state are not "neutral, value-free arbiters, independent of and unaffected by
social and, economic relations, political forces, and cultural phenomena. Tradi-
tional jurisprudence largely ignores social and historical reality, and masks the
existence of social conflict and oppression with ideological myths about
objectivity and neutrality."62 In essence, the law often reflects and enforces
dominant power sources by means of individuals who may honestly believe in
their own neutrality.
Further in the United States, at least, the law is a highly respected force
for the perpetuation of existing power relations by the consent of the gov-
58. Id.
59. See generally Paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control (Yale
1970).
60. Fletcher, Humanhood at 12 (cited in note 57).
61. Id at 12-16.
62. David Kairys, ed, The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 3 (Pantheon 1982).
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erned: the lower and the middle classes. Accordingly the law confers a legiti-
macy on a social system and ideology that cloaks itself in ideology, science,
with an occasional reference to God that is dominated by a corporate elite-a
very effective means of control.63 This thesis is not necessarily associated with
evil intent, nor a master player who pulls on the strings of those who are
powerless. Unfortunately, some if not many of those who have power may not
even be aware of their potential, not only for good, which they may honestly
profess, but for harm-a dangerous situation for the powerless. It is far easier
to combat malevolent individuals who know what they are doing than to
censure persons who sincerely are unaware that they too are culpable.
On the other hand, this account of the law is not the dominant view. We
cloak ourselves in the Constitution and consistently profess to speculate on the
intentions of the Founding Fathers-translated: white, male, upperclass, Prot-
estants, some of whom were slaveholders, and who did not intend to confer
equality on the non-propertied classes, women, or slaves. The government that
they imagined was reminiscent of that of ancient Athens during the time of
Socrates and Plato, a society in which these masses were not, by any stretch
of the imagination, looked upon as worthy of participation.
Kairys concluded that the ideological role of precepts like legal reasoning
is only one segment of a larger, general social phenomenon. Social and
political judgments become sacrosanct from the appearance of expertise and
analysis that falsely purport to be neutral, objective, and quasi-scientific. As
Kairys succinctly stated, "If religion is the opiate of the masses, it seems that
objectivity, expertise, and science have become the tranquilizers."64
Dame Mary Warnock and The Mythology of Common Values
A perennial moral clich6 is that society's problems stem from a retreat
from common values. This lofty archetype is incongruous with a pluralist
society. The mythology of common values or a shared moral view was recently
argued in Great Britain. Lord Devlin stated in his objections to the Warnock
Committee Report that a shared moral view is the cement that binds society
together.6 The Committee argued in favor of in vitro fertilization and surro-
gate motherhood under certain conditions.66 Lord Devlin argued that the law
could not permit acts that contravened shared morality. Dame Mary Warnock
replied that a "common morality" is a myth.67 Even so, the sanctity of a
common morality is often used as an excuse for discriminatory public policy.
It is far better for those who have power to delude people to voluntarily lead
63. Id at 5.
64. David Kairys, Legal Reasoning in David Kairys, ed, The Politics of Law 3, 17
(Pantheon 1982).
65. Lord Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford 1959).
66. See generally Mary Warnock, A Question of Life (Blackwell 1959).
67. Id at xi.
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themselves to the chopping block by embracing policies adverse to their
interests.
Amartya Sen: Economics and Ethics
Amartya Sen asserted that the needs of policy require that something must
be done, even nothing for nothing is a decision." Nevertheless, Sen main-
tained that there should be sufficient reason for choosing one policy rather
than another. Even so, the need for decision may not resolve conflicts. Conse-
quently, institutional public decisions may appear to be based upon only
partial justifications. Nevertheless, Sen has stated that there is no departure
from rational choice. He gives the classical example of Buridan's ass which
died because he could not decide which of two haystacks was the better."9
The poor animal could have chosen either rather than dying from lack of
food. Even so, the poor ass had no reason to choose one over the other. Sen
postulated that rational public decisions must come to terms with such
partially justified choices. Much of decision-making and public policy with
respect to the individual versus the so-called common good is of this nature,
particularly when confronted with the conundrum of autonomy, individual
interest and the perceived public interest-as we travel down the slope to
follow.
The Limitation of Health Care for Elderly Persons
Daniel Callahan, the former President and Founder of the Hastings Center,
the preeminent center for bioethics in the United States, has proposed age-
based rationing of health care for elderly persons to alleviate escalating health
care costs. Pain relief would be in order, but not life-saving measures,
including nutrition. In short, aged individuals past their late seventies or early
eighties should go quietly into the night in order that the generation to follow
would have access to health care-in their early years. Although, Barry and
Bradley assembled numerous health care experts to refute Callahan's propos-
al,7 Callahan's policy fills ancient folklore. However, this subject may be
skirted in Callahan's proposal. The aged are doomed to premature death, and
it does not come with dignity.
The Police Power of the State
The doctrine of the police power of the state, as decreed in the landmark
Supreme Court decision of Munn v Illinois is an example of fundamental
68. Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics 67 (Blackwell 1987).
69. Id at 67-68.
70. Daniel Callahan, Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society (Simon &
Schuster 1987).
71. Robert L. Barry and Gerard V. Bradley, eds, Set No Limits: A Rebuttal to Daniel
Callahan's Proposal to Limit Health Care for the Elderly 117-28 (Illinois 1991).
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utilitarianism." This ruling established that the private interests of the indi-
vidual must be subservient to the public interest, and formed the basis for the
constitutionality of such diverse edicts as mandatory vaccination, seat belt, and
sterilization laws.73 In short, whatever the state deems critical for the public
good is supported by the umbrella of the police power of the state, provided,
of course, that the law does not negate the Constitution. The abrogation of
Munn, however, would obliterate some of the most basic tenets of our demo-
cratic society. Paradoxically, the doctrine that the private interests of the
individual must be subservient to the public interest is in accordance with both
totalitarianism and democracy. Consequently and disturbingly, eugenics may
prosper under disparate systems of government.
Mandatory Sterilization
I now move from a landmark unintentional decree that facilitates eugenics,
Munn v Illinois, to one that was deliberately and patently eugenic: the Su-
preme Court's decision of Buck v Bell in 1926, which established then-and
still today-the constitutionality of the right of the States to mandate steriliza-
tion of women and men to protect the "public welfare."74 Unfortunately,
Coogan found that Carrie Buck, her mother, and her daughter were probably
not even mentally retarded, but the product of a hopeless environment.'
Undoubtedly, local attitudes also influence sterilization practices. In a
poignant article, Herbert Aptheker cited some tragic examples of sterilization
of poor blacks.76 Aptheker records that in July 1973, Mr. and Mrs. Lonnie
Relf complained to the Southern Poverty Law Center of Montgomery, Ala-
bama, that two of their daughters, age 12 and 14, had been surgically steril-
ized without their knowledge.' Another daughter, age 17, had escaped steril-
ization only because she had resisted. Prior to the sterilizations, these three
children had also been injected with an experimental drug to prevent con-
ception. When tests found the drug to be carcinogenic, authorities in the
Federal Government ordered the investigation stopped. The Montgomery
officials then ordered the sterilization of the children.
Other cases came to light. Aiker County Hospital records showed that of
34 deliveries paid for by Medicaid in 1972, 18 included sterilization; all 18
were black women; and all 18 were performed by the same physician who
72. See generally Munn v Illinois, 94 US 113 (1876).
73. Id at 126.
74. Buck v Bell, 274 US 200, 207 (1927).
75. J.E. Coogan, Eugenic Sterilization Holds Jubilee, 177 Catholic World 44, 46
(1953).
76. Herbert Aptheker, Sterilization and Imperialism in Herbert Aptheker, Racism, Impe-
rialism, and Peace: Selected Essays by Herbert Aptbeker 143 (MEP 1987).
77. Id.
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stated that his policy was to require sterilization after a woman on welfare
had had three children. 7
Aptheker further pointed out that in 1974, 14 states were in the process
of considering legislation that would require women on welfare to submit to
sterilization.79 He cited Garrett Hardin in his book, Exploring New Ethics for
Survival, as proposing that "if a state supports children, it should have the
power to legally divest potential parents of such children of the capacity to
reproduce." 0
In 1966, Elyce Ferster asserted that there was indeed growing support for
the restriction of costs of welfare by involuntary sterilization."' Ferster con-
cluded with a statement that should serve as a reminder to those who main-
tain that public policy will not take this route:
Proponents of involuntary sterilization, both in the past and today seem
to imply that those who oppose these laws place the right of procreation
above the welfare of society. It is possible that the day will come when
this statement is accurate. The hereditary nature of these conditions may
be established, or all reasonable attempts at improving the environment
and rehabilitation of the disabled may fail, or food and air shortages may
become so severe that there might not be enough to bear the burden of
any further growth in population, then, there will be a choice between
sterilization and the rights of the individual. If the time comes when any
of these conditions exists, and if efforts at birth control fail, and if we
can decide who should be sterilized and who is qualified to make this
decision, then perhaps legislation authorizing involuntary sterilization
could be justified."
Eugenic precepts in the United States often are firmly imbedded in legisla-,
tion and in court decisions, including the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the
intent of some legislative and court edicts may not have been to promote
bigotry, racism, classism, or anti-Semitism, but they have had that effect.
Although Nazi Germany is often held up to public execration-and is a model
whipping post for the atrocities of eugenics-the paradigm for Hitler's final
solution was the American eugenics movement of the 1920s, in which geneti-
cists were major players in the initiation of a eugenics public policy. And the
same jurists who made Germany repeal its mandatory sterilization laws
returned home to similar laws on the books of many states.
78. Id at 145.
79. Id at 146-47.
80. Id at 147. See generally Garett Hardin, Exploring New Ethics for Survival: The
Voyage of the Spaceship Beagle (Viking 1972).
81. Elyce Zenoff Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit: Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 Ohio
St L J 591, 623-625 (1966).
82. Id at 624-625.
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Marriage and the Family
The police power of the state also invades marriage and the family. Family
definitions and marriage restrictions also open the door to eugenics, because
many of the prohibitions against marriage-particularly those against consan-
guineous mating-are far less defensible biologically than the mating of carriers
with identical traits for genetic disorders. The banning of consanguineous
mating facilitates the interdiction of mating of carriers for sickle cell disease,
Tay-Sachs disease, cystic fibrosis, and eventually the mating of carriers of
several thousand genetic disorders, once the techniques for early diagnosis in
utero are developed.
In the early 1970s students representing "Science for the People" came to
my office quite excited about a revision of the Illinois Domestic Relations Act
proposed by the Chicago Bar Association-and rightfully so. In essence the Bar
Association was concerned about children being born with severe genetic
defects. The remedy? It was proposed that before a couple could marry,
appropriate tests should be made to ensure that children with severe birth
defects could not be born from the union.83 Of course, such a prohibition
was nonsensical because all marriage in Illinois would have been
banned-Holy, or otherwise. After much persuasion through a friend who was
on the committee of the Bar Association, this and several other odd pro-
hibitions were withdrawn.
The Right Not to Procreate and Abortion Inequity
The expanding field of prenatal diagnosis could not have been developed
without the landmark Supreme Court decision of Roe v Wade, which estab-
lished the right for a woman to have an abortion-under certain conditions. 4
This decision was preceded by Griswold v Connecticut, which, by establishing
the right of married couples to use contraceptives, thereby established the right
not to procreate." Although abortion is legal, the Supreme Court decisions of
Maher v Roe and Harris v McRae, and the Congressional legislation known as
the "Hyde Amendment" established that even if abortion is legal-under
certain conditions-the state has no obligation to pay for abortion. 6
Limited Resources and Health Care Eugenics
Several states have decreased benefits for parents receiving Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC).87 California, Connecticut, Delaware, Geor-
83. James E. Bowman, Genetic Screening Programs and Public Policy, 38 Phylon 117,
136-138 (June 1977).
84. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
85. Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
86. Maher v Roe, 432 US 464 (1977); Harris v McRae, 448 US 297 (1980); Hyde
Amendment, Pub L No 94-439, 90 Stat 1434 (1976), codified at 42 USC S 2000d (1988).
87. Christopher Jencks, Can We Put a Time Limit on Welfare?, The American Prospect
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gia, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Ohio, Tennessee, Mississippi, North Carolina,
and Virginia have all supported punitive action against those who might in the
future conceive a child out of wedlock, and some even attempted to mandate
the imprisonment or sterilization of women who have more than one child
born out of wedlock."8 More recently, President Clinton suggested during his
1992 campaign that no one be allowed to collect AFDC for more than two
years. As a follow-up, Clinton supported Wisconsin legislation to impose a
two-year limit on indigent families with children. All of these measures have
the sanction of the highest Court in the land. In 1970, the Supreme Court in
Dandridge v Williams upheld the legality of a Maryland law which set a
maximum welfare grant of $250 per month no matter how many children
were in the recipient family.90 An extension of this precedent to include the
restriction of the birth of children who have severe birth defects would
certainly be more cost effective than the interdiction of the birth of children
who do not have birth defects.
As noted earlier, laws and practices with eugenic implications are often
designed for other purposes. For instance, universal health care may operate to
discourage the birth of children with genetic defects, because of their perceived
burden on public funds. The limit to state support of children born of mothers
who are on welfare is a policy that has eugenic implications for poor mothers
who repeatedly bear children with "preventable" genetic disorders. Scientific
advances in genetics create a fertile ground for eugenics, because inequities in
the delivery and costs of health care have led to plans for additional rationing
of health care under the rubric of broadening the base of our market health
care system to include the millions bf Americans who are mere bystanders to
decent preventive health care and health. If health care resources are indeed
scarce-a euphemism for "health care resources are scarce for the
poor"-economic pressures to reduce health care costs may (will) one day
restrict the birth of children with "preventable" severe genetic disorders by
indirect coercion or by mandatory legislative and court prohibitions. Accord-
ingly, I suggest that eugenics may re-enter public policy under the guise of
"limited resources." The recurring theme of "limited resources" coincides with
an explosion of scientific advances in genetic testing from ova to spermatozoa,
to blastulae, to fetal and trophoblastic cells in pregnant women, to fetuses, to
newborns, to children, to adults, and even to ancient remains of the dead.
Even though health care resources are parotted as scarce, this myth is
belied by the practices of many health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that
are supposed to bring savings to our health care system. Woolhandler and
Himmelstein indicated that these systems pressure doctors to exploit patients'
32 (Fall 1992).
88. See generally Rickie Solinger, Wake up Little Susie: Single Pregnancy and Race
Before Roe v Wade 53-57 (Routledge 1992).
89. Jason DeParle, Wisconsin to Impose a 2-Year Limit on Welfare, Louisville Courier-
Journal 2A (Nov 9, 1993).
90. Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471 (1970).
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trust for financial gain.9' Doctors' incomes are tied to curtailing service.
Meanwhile, the chief officers of these plans demonstrate the advantages (not
to the patients) of a market system of health care. For example, Woolhandler
and Himmelstein pointed out that the 2.4 million-member U.S. Healthcare
organization spends only 74.4 percent of revenues on medical care and $1
million per day goes to profits, adding to its $1.2 billion cash reserve.92 The
chief executive officer of this plan made $20 million in a single year and holds
$534 million in company stock.93
The Sickle Hemoglobin Fiasco
9 4
Sickle hemoglobin testing was initiated in the early 1970s following the
commercialization of a solubility test for sickle hemoglobin by a major
pharmaceutical company.95 Although widely advertised, this test did not
delineate sickle cell trait from sickle cell disease. In addition, most educational
brochures implied that sickle cell anemia is confined to blacks despite its
prevalence in other populations including Greeks, Southern Italians, Arabs,
Southern Iranians, Asian Indians, and descendants of these groups.
By June 1977, at least twelve states passed mandatory sickle hemoglobin
screening laws, usually under pressure from black community organizations.96
Many laws imposed testing of particular groups-blacks and specified pre-
school and school children, couples before marriage, and, in one case, inmates
of mental and correctional institutions. Major corporations began selectively
screening blacks. For example, black flight attendants who tested positive for
sickle hemoglobin were discharged. 97 The majority of the major life insurance
companies raised rates as much as 25 percent on persons with sickle cell trait,
even though the life expectancy of individuals with sickle cell trait is the same
as the life expectancy of those who do not have sickle hemoglobin.98
Sickle cell organizations proliferated and vied for funds, many replicating
the misinformation available in black communities until the passage of the
National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act. 99 Although the Act's title, "The Na-
tional Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act," was unfortunate because the "control"
of sickle cell anemia is only possible through eugenic practices reminiscent of
Nazi Germany, the Act created a National Sickle Cell Disease Program with
91. Steffie Woolhander and David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New Corporate
Proposition for Physicians, 333 NE J Med 1706 (Dec 21, 1991).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. For a fuller description of "The Sickle Hemoglobin Fiasco," see Bowman, 38
Phylon at 117-142 (cited in note 83).
95. Id.
96. Id at 126.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act, Pub L No 92-294, 86 Stat 136 (1972),
codified as amended at 42 USC S 300 (1994).
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support of community education, testing and counseling programs, Comprehen-
sive Sickle Centers with education, testing, counseling and research compo-
nents, and Program Projects which conducted research."° Along with federal
guidelines for education, testing, and counseling programs, the program
rebutted the equation of sickle cell trait with sickle cell disease.
Nevertheless, the federally supported screening and education clinics were
directed to perform mass population screenings of up to the unrealistic goal of
20,000 subjects per year."1 The personnel needed to care- for the educational
and other needs of the target populations was not available. As I have stated
before, the ostensible objective of these programs was to enable the community
to make informed decisions about reproduction. "But what were the options
before the advent of prenatal diagnosis? They were somewhat distasteful: ab-
stinence, artificial insemination, genetic roulette, or abortion."102
The development of techniques for newborn screening, and the prenatal
diagnosis of sickle cell disease, began a new phase of hemoglobin screening.
Thus, the major accomplishment of the National Sickle Cell Disease Program
became screening of newborns to reduce morbidity and mortality rates in
infants with sickle cell disease through treatment with penicillin prophylaxis to
prevent infections, particularly those of pneumococcal origin. 03
Prenatal Diagnosis for Sickle Hemoglobin. 4
In 1991, a team of physicians lead by Peter Rowley published their
investigation of the feasibility of prenatal education, testing, and counseling of
pregnant women from black, white, Asian, and other ethnic groups for
hemoglobinopathies.'0 5 The study uncovered several important issues. Among
them, the study asked if programs for prenatal testing for hemoglobinopathies
should include only populations at high risk, such as blacks, peoples of
Mediterranean origin, Middle Easterners, Asians, or Southeast Asians? Appar-
ently not, given that at least 7 percent of the subjects with sickle cell trait
were not black, and 22 percent of individuals with 8-thalassemia trait were not
Mediterranean, black or Asian."0 6 The authors concluded that all women
should have prenatal hemoglobinopathy screening, rather than only those of
high-risk groups.107
100. Id.
101. James E. Bowman, Invited Editorial: Prenatal Prescreening for Hemogiobinopathies,
48 Am J Hum Gen 433, 434 (1991).
102. Id..
103. Marilyn H. Gaston, et al, Prophylaxis with Oral Penicillin in Children with Sickle
Cell Anemia: A Randomized Trial, 314 NE J Med 1593 (June 1986).
104. For a fuller description of prenatal diagnosis for sickle hemoglobin, see James E.
Bowman, 48 Am J Hum Gen 433 (cited in note 101).
105. Peter T. Rowley, et al, Prenatal Screening for Hemoglobinopathies, 48 Am J Hum
Gen 439 (1991).
106. Id at 441.
107. Id.
19961
510 Roundtable
Out-Of-Wedlock Births
Lamentably, an escalating out-of-wedlock birth rate in the black communi-
ty is frequently ignored in federal and community programs, and in premarital
sickle hemoglobin state testing mandates." 8 Genetics programs are usually
constructed on the basis of the classical description of the family. The testing
of couples before marriage and of marriage partners is emphasized, but reality
is ignored. William Julius Wilson investigated family patterns and out-of-
wedlock births in the black community.' 9 The proportion of women married
and living with their husbands decreased from 52 percent in 1947 to only 34
percent in 1980."0 The jobless rate for black males is a major factor in the
out-of wedlock birth rate, because black women see little advantage in marry-
ing a man who has little prospect for contributing to family support."'
Nationally, out-of-wedlock black births in 1970 accounted for 37.4 percent of
black births and in 1987, 62.2 percent.' 1 2 The lessons are obvious. A genetics
program that depends on the cooperation of putative fathers and partners who
are readily available places the pregnant woman who does not wish to have a
child with sickle cell disease in an untenable position, and discounts the
quandary of the majority of the target population.
Lippman asserted that with the advent of prenatal diagnosis, a woman's
pregnancy becomes both a social and a biological pregnancy." 3 She becomes
separable into two, herself and her fetus. Accordingly independent interests
may now be assigned to the fetus and the mother. A woman can be subject to
rules and regulations and duties as a result of the potential for fetal abuse. A
woman's pregnancy now becomes the potential domain not only of herself and
her husband or mate, but the family, other children, the community and that
vague entity-society. The woman who bears a child with a preventable seri-
ous genetic disorder now becomes a problem, particularly if she is poor and
must seek public assistance.
Wrongful Birth; Wrongful Life
Once medical advances become part of the public domain, the courts have
invariably supported their use, and expect patients to be made aware of them.
108. James E. Bowman, Is a National Program to Prevent Sickle Cell Disease Possible?,
5 Am J Ped Hematol 367, 370 (1983).
109. William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass
and Public Policy 66-73 (Chicago 1987).
110. Id at 68.
111. Id at 91.
112. National Center for Health Statistics, Health United States 1989 (GPO 1990)
(DHHS Pub No (PHS) 85-1232).
113. Abby Lippman, The Genetic Construction of Prenatal Testing: Choice, Consent, or
Conformity for Women? in Karen H. Rothenberg and Elizabeth J. Thomson, eds, Women
and Prenatal Testing: Facing the Challenges of Genetic Technology 9, 21-22 (Ohio St
1994).
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Accordingly, failure to inform patients of medical advances has been a source
of litigation-which leads to the discussion of wrongful birth and wrongful
life. One of the first wrongful life cases, Gleitman v Cosgrove, dismissed a
woman's malpractice claim against the doctors who failed to inform her that
she would bear a child with severe birth defects."' Gleitman sued on the
theory that she should have been allowed to decide to have an abortion. The
judge rejected Gleitman's argument because abortion was illegal, and therefore
the physician was under no obligation to suggest an illegal act. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the legality issue and instead based its
ruling on the grounds that Gleitman's child "would almost surely choose life
with defects as against no life at all."" s
Interestingly, even though abortion is now legal-under certain condi-
tions-Congress and the courts have repeatedly decreed that the state is under
no obligation to fund abortions for poor women. Nevertheless, the states
generally pay for Medicaid recipients who choose to undergo tubal ligation, a
form of voluntary (indirectly coercive) sterilization for poor women. 6 Ac-
cordingly, sterilization as an option to prevent future children with genetic
disorders now has a more scientific rationale, but will disproportionately, as
always, be limited, mainly, to poor women.
A variety of bacteria, viruses, chemicals and other agents (and now, AIDS)
are harmful to the fetus and the newborn. The reduction in neonatal gonor-
rhea ophthalmia and syphilis was due, in part, to litigation, which employed
concepts from contract, negligence, and battery law, all of which formed the
basis for the common law of malpractice. The improvement of contraceptive
procedures and of methods for prenatal and postnatal genetic diagnosis
induced courts to make these discoveries available (within limits) and to
sanction liability. Of course, the women whose cases pioneered this litigation
could not have foreseen the rapid development of prenatal diagnosis, and the
potential for direct or indirect coercion to have "perfect" children.
In a wrongful birth action, the physician or another person or organization
is sued by the parent for failure to prevent the birth of an unwanted child, or
to prevent the birth of a child with a genetic or other disease. In a wrongful
life action, the child, or the parent sues (on behalf of the child) and claims
that the child would have been better off by not having been born." 7 But
this allegation has serious problems. Tedeschi pointed out that the act of the
parent which the child claims injured him is the very act but for which the
child would not exist."8
114. Gleitman v Cosgrove, 49 NJ 22, 227 A2d 689 (1967).
115. Gleitman, 49 NJ at 30.
116. Information confirmed by Planned Parenthood, Chicago Office, for The University
of Chicago Law School Roundtable, Nov 13, 1996.
117. Alexander Morgan Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 Colum L Rev
618, 632-660 (1979).
118. G. Tedeschi, On Tort Liability For "Wrongful Life", 1 Israel L Rev 513, 528-30
(1966).
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Margery Shaw's arguments could indicate the direction of human genetics
policy."9 Shaw maintained that the right to reproduce is not absolute and
cited state prohibitions against certain types of marriage.12 ° But Shaw went
further and asserted that genes, like infectious agents, are transmissible units,
and that the law can impose quarantine and compulsory vaccination in order
to control communicable diseases. Shaw also offered comparisons between
genetic and infectious diseases: both are transmitted to others; both vary in
their rate of "contagion"; both are unequally distributed among populations;
and both vary in morbidity and mortality.
Shaw argued that since recovery for fetal injuries is legal, children may sue
their parents for prenatal injury.' Shaw indicated that in most situations the
defendant would be the mother, because the mother is the only one who has
direct control over the fetus. Thus negligent exposure to noxious chemicals,
drugs, refusal to accept genetic counseling and prenatal diagnosis, refusal of
prenatal therapy, or failure to take a modified diet for phenylketonuria could
be the basis for action.' Smith v Brennan was quoted in defense of this
position: "the child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and
body."' 23 In other words, the child's right to a healthy life takes priority
over the right to reproduce. Shaw used as precedent child abuse statues. She
would compel parents and prospective parents to enter alcohol and drug
rehabilitation programs that would take custody of the fetus to prevent mental
and physical harm.2
Shaw was prescient. The rights of the fetus (if there are any) are now
pitted against maternal duties and rights. Pregnant women who drink alcohol
or who are cited for drug abuse have been censured, and, in South Carolina
pregnant cocaine users have even been incarcerated. 2 ' Fetal abuse is equated
with child abuse. It is inescapable, however, that there is no greater fetal abuse
than abortion. Yet, it has been suggested that charges of genetic neglect may
follow women who elect to have children affected with preventable congenital
and genetic disorders.' 2 ' Accordingly, family, community and societal pres-
sures could open a path to eugenics by questioning the discretion of women
who elect to have children with preventable genetic disorders. Not surprisingly,
since risk analysis is a major factor in insurance and employment, recent
119. Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J Leg Med 63
(1984).
120. Id at 93.
121. Id at 94.
122. Id at 95.
123. Smith v Brennan, 31 NJ 353, 364, 157 A2d 497, 503 (1960); Shaw, 5 J Leg Med
at 95 (cited in note 119).
124. Id at 98-104.
125. Editorial, Jail for Pregnant Cocaine Users in US, 303 Br Med J 873 (Oct 12,
1991).
126. Shaw, 5 J Leg Med at 90-95 (cited in note 119).
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advances in genetic prediction may be taken into account in acceptability for
health and life insurance and employability.
Insurance and Employment
Although prenatal diagnosis and abortion are acceptable, and offered with
alacrity, health and life insurers and companies often deny insurance or jobs
to those who have genetic disorders or who are at risk for having children
with severe genetic disorders. On the other hand, employers and insurance
companies only reflect our market system of government. Even The Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 does not restrict insurers or any agents that
administer benefit plans from underwriting risks that are based on or not
inconsistent with state law."7 Unfortunately, employers, often have no choice
but to follow their insurance companies in their hiring policies.
Indirect and direct coercion in health and life insurance and employment
is an almost inevitable path to cryptic eugenics. Employers should have access
to the health status of applicant employees in order to establish whether health
status may have an effect on job performance. Consider a small company in
which the health status of even a few individuals or families could affect other
employees or the survival of the entire company. A company provides not only
health coverage but voluntary genetic testing with informed consent at no
charge to the employee. A couple who is at risk for having a child with sickle
cell anemia, or thalassemia, or cystic fibrosis may find that the fetus is affected
following prenatal diagnosis. Nevertheless, after stating that they will abort if
the fetus is affected they relent and decide to have the affected child, with
consequent prohibitive cost. Or; an upcoming young executive with the
company has a father with Huntington disease. He has a 50 percent chance of
developing a severe neurological disorder in his middle years with dementia.
He refuses to be tested and soon becomes affected, with prohibitive insurance
costs. Collins pointed out that the discovery of the BRCA1 gene may place
women who have an increased risk for breast cancer in danger of losing their
health insurance for women whose insurance is derived from plans funded by
their employers.'
It could be argued that there are rights to procreation or that individuals
have a right not to submit themselves to genetic testing that may compromise
their insurance or employment. On the other hand, to borrow from Richard
Epstein, in cases of limited exemptions for senior citizens from discrimination,
the Unrah Act of California began with a declaration of the freedom and
equality of all persons and proceeded as if it followed that discrimination by
private parties on the basis of race, sex religion, blindness, other physical
disability and other factors be banned."a Epstein indicated that "[t]he second
127. Marvin R. Natowicz, et al, Genetic Discrimination and the Law, 50 Am J Hum
Gen 465, 471 (1992).
128. See generally F. Collins, BRCA-1 Lots of Mutations, Lots of Dilemmas 334 NE J
Med 186 (1995).
129. Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Dis-
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part does not follow from the first, for all are free and equal only when they
trade on terms of mutual advantage." 13' Accordingly, from Epstein's model
the preferences of the other employees are ignored. And even worse at the
next round of insurance evaluation, insurance costs for all could either be
prohibitively increased, or the insurance company could drop the company
from its list, or it could selectively drop families with prohibitive costs.
Someone pays. Who? Is such a practice eugenics by indirection? Or, does it
not behoove us to recognize social responsibility, lest we all find ourselves in
a coercive eugenic society?
The Imperfect
Kay Jamison, Professor of Psychiatry at Johns Hopkins Medical School,
who also serves on the National Advisory Committee for Human Genome
Research, discovered an incidence of manic depressive illness among poets,
composers, and other artists of from 30 to 50 percent.1 31 If we are ever able
to prevent manic depressive illness by prenatal diagnosis and abortion-or cure
manic depressive illness-there could be a detrimental effect on creativity.
Samuel Coleridge Taylor, Emily Dickinson, T. S. Eliot, Victor Hugo, Samuel
Johnson, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Ezra Pound, Edgar Allan Poe, Alfred Lord
Tennyson, Walt Whitman, Hans Christian Anderson, Honore de Balzac,
Charles Dickens, William Faulkner, Hector Berlioz, Handel, Gustav Mahler,
Rachmaninoff, Rossini, Tchaikovsky, Irving Berlin, Cole Porter, Charles Parker,
Paul Gaugin, Vincent van Gogh, Michelangelo, and Jackson Pollock could have
been on an unfit hit list.
32
More recently, Jamison poignantly documented her own battle with manic-
depressive illness since the age of seventeen. 133 When she was interviewed for
an appointment at Johns Hopkins School of Medicine she felt that she should
reveal to the Chairman of Psychiatry her manic-depressive illness. The Chair-
man assured her that he already knew that and that if they were to ban all
who had manic-depressive illness, Johns Hopkins would lose some of its best
faculty. 3 1
Eugenics, Disguised and Otherwise
IQ and aptitude tests in the United States and in Great Britain determine
the course of the lives of children at an early age. Scholars still make a
comfortable living substantiating over and over that poor, discriminated, under-
crimination Laws 64 (Harvard 1992).
130. Id.
131. See generally Kay Redfield Jamison, Touched With Fire: Manic Depression Illness
and the Artistic Temperment (Free Press 1993).
132. See generally id.
133. Kay Redfield Jamison, An Unquiet Mind (Knopf 1995).
134. Id at 208-209.
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nourished, unhealthy children, who live in substandard housing, with few, if
any, books in the home do not achieve as well as the more affluent. (It would
be incomprehensible if they did.) Nevertheless, the precepts of the old eugeni-
cists are endorsed by some of our most distinguished scholars and leaders. For
example, I quote from Ingle:
To be born into a culture that enslaves may be as much of a handicap
to a child as to be born with defective genes. It is common for family
histories to show parents, children, and grandchildren on welfare rolls.
Some are there because they inherit low intelligence and possibly low
drives. Some have poor health. Others come onto welfare and stay there
because they have inherited a culture that does not respect education, job
responsibility, the property of others, the law, and the rules of society.
These social ills are just as contagious as some physical ills and should
be quarantined to prevent spreading.13
In 1977, Blumenthal exceeded the fondest hopes of the American Eugenics
Movement of the 1920s by stating that if China were to develop a selective
breeding program, America should follow. Under this general program:
All prospective parents would be licensed. Some would be licensed to
reproduce but not to rear children, others to rear but not to reproduce
and still others both to beget and rear children. Licensed all-round
parents should not have serious genetic defects; they should love children
and want to be parents; they should know the rudiments of nutrition,
child psychology and education; they should not have serious bad habits
e.g. alcoholism and dope addiction and they should have a high probabil-
ity of being able to provide economic support sufficient to enable their
children to become happy and good citizens. The number of children that
a couple could have would be determined by the state. 3 '
Dissent: Grad and Penrose
Frank Grad has offered a perceptive caution to those who espouse modify-
ing future generations through eugenics:
It is clear, however, that the availability of new biologic techniques and
their potential for eugenic controls-both positive and negative-may
have a deep impact on family structure, on the relation of the family to
the state, and on the decision-making and planning processes of gov-
ernment. It is unlikely that a society can simultaneously maintain both
freedom of the person and an effective, i.e., compulsory, eugenic pro-
gram. Even if a eugenic program were only voluntary, would not the
135. Dwight J. Ingle, Who Should Have Cbildren?: An Environmental and Genetic Ap-
proach 81 (Bobbs-Merril 1973).
136. Albert Blumenthal, Moral Responsbility: Mankind's Greatest Need 257 (Rayline
1975).
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individual's choice of a mate and of whether to procreate fall subject to
some official persuasion as to what eugenic practices or standards are
desirable?'13
One of the most outspoken opponents of eugenics was the late Lionel S.
Penrose, FRS, who ironically was the Galton Professor, University College
London. When Penrose became Galton Professor, he also became Editor of the
Annals of Eugenics. Much to the consternation of some geneticists, Penrose
changed the name of the Annals of Eugenics to the Annals of Human Genet-
ics.'38 Kevles succinctly summed up Penrose's disdain for eugenics:
Thoughtful people on both sides of the Atlantic agreed with Lionel
Penrose, who declared a few years before his death that he 'would rather
live in a genetically imperfect society which preserves human standards of
life than in one in which technological standards were paramount and
heredity perfect.""9
And today, IQ eugenics has once more reared its head in a best seller, The
Bell Curve by Herrenstein and Murray.'40
Democratic Pluralism or Covert Eugenics?
Finally, we may continue to muddle through. Nevertheless, the specter of
eugenics is alive and well. The application of genetic technology to eugenic
ends is compatible with numerous court and legislative decisions - some of
which had no eugenic intent. The assault on the poor, particularly poor
unmarried mothers, and the perception that health care resources are
scarce-no matter what system of health care - may eventually lead to the
restriction of the birth of children with a variety of preventable genetic
disorders, and to the institution of both subtle and draconian measures by
insurance companies, employers, the family, and society to directly or indirectly
coerce individuals and their families to conform.
Interestingly, anti-choice and the opposing pro-choice movements may serve
as buffers to eugenics. The anti-choice movement opposes abortion, a modern
tool to eliminate the "unfit," but the pro-choice movement fosters autonomy
and freedom of women to choose or not choose abortion. If autonomy
prevails, society will not be able to mandate abortion without alienating a
powerful segment of our society. Interestingly, however, the state will pay for
sterilization, which could encourage eugenics. On the other hand, to promote
137. Frank P. Grad, New Beginnings in Life: A Lawyer's Response, in Michael Ham-
ilton, ed, The New Genetics and the Future of Man 64, 70 (Eerdmans 1972).
138. Daniel J. Kevies, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human
Heredity 252 (Knopf 1985).
139. Id at 289.
140. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class
Structure in American Life (Free Press 1994).
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public funding for abortion (as pointed out to me by Neil Holtzman many
years ago) is to increase the likelihood of state-ordered abortion for eugenic
reasons.
The path from medical genetics to eugenics is a continuum, with full
knowledge that this assertion is anathema to many medical geneticists and
genetic counselors. Rightfully, their principal concern is the patient and the
family. They wish to ensure that decisions on procreation are voluntary and
made with informed consent. On the other hand, once technology is devel-
oped, it usually is utilized. National Institutes of Health (NIH), or American
Society of Human Genetics committees, or Institute of Medicine committees,
or other organizations often meet and make scholarly pronouncements about
the use and abuse of genetics, and produce scientific and ethical "guidelines."
In this day of rapid communication, however public policy may be determined
by diverse groups-many with covert agendas.
Jean Paul Sartre: Existentialism is Humanism
Jean Paul Sartre explored the dilemma of moral decision-making in his
famous lecture, Existentialism is Humanism, delivered in Paris on October 29,
1945.141 During the occupation of France a student came to Sartre for ad-
vice. The student's father favored collaboration with the Nazis, and the
student's older brother had been killed in the German offensive. The father
had left home. The student wished to avenge his brother's death, but his
mother was now alone, was totally dependent on him, and lived only for him.
The student wanted to go to England to join the Free French Forces, but he
also wanted to stay with his mother and help her. Sartre posited that the
student was torn between the morality of personal devotion and the morality
of defending society. Sartre answered that Christian doctrine could not help
him choose because both choices satisfy the criteria of Christian morality.
Kantian ethics was to no avail, because the student could not consistently treat
everyone as an end; someone would have to be treated as a means. Sartre told
the student that the only answer that he could give was that he was free to
choose. In other words, there is no system of ethics that could resolve these
competing values.
Freedom to choose may prevail. But don't bet on it.
141. See generally T.Z. Lavine, From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophic Quest 366-367
(Bantam 1984).
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